Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks? by Hahn, Volker
Should central banks remain silent about
their private information on cost-push
shocks?
By Volker Hahn
Center of Economic Research, ETH Zurich, ZUE D13, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland;
e-mail: vhahn@ethz.ch
We propose a signalling model in which the central bank and firms receive information
on cost-push shocks independently of each other. If the firms are rather unlikely
to receive information directly, the central bank should remain silent about its
own private information. If, however, firms are sufficiently likely to be informed, it
is socially desirable for the central bank to reveal its own private information. By doing
so, the central bank eliminates the distortions stemming from the signalling incentives
under opacity. An ex ante transparency requirement can improve welfare even if
central banks have the possibility to withhold information discretionarily. Moreover,
our model may provide a rationale for the recent trend towards more transparency
in monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
During the last two decades, central banks’ communication practices have changed
dramatically. While traditionally central banks were wrapped in mystery and
withheld information about their policies, their assessment of the economy,
details of decision-making and the goals of monetary policy, they have gradually
become substantially more open. In 1987, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, Alan Greenspan, took pride in being secretive: ‘Since I’ve become a central
banker’, he noted, ‘I’ve learned to mumble with great incoherence’.1 Nowadays
such a statement would be unthinkable. For example, the present chairman Ben
Bernanke called the ‘increased openness’ of monetary-policy makers a ‘welcome
development’ in 2007.2
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1Wall Street Journal, September 22, 1987.
2‘Federal Reserve Communications’, speech delivered at the Cato Institute 25th Annual Monetary
Conference, Washington, DC, November 14, 2007.
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In this paper, we examine whether this development is socially beneficial. For this
purpose, we present a simple model, populated by a central bank that receives
private information about cost-push shocks and a continuum of firms that may
receive information from the central bank or through other sources. As shown by
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) in their Corollary 9, private agents’ information about
socially inefficient sources of business-cycle fluctuations reduces welfare. The fact
that cost-push shocks represent such socially inefficient sources of fluctuations
therefore suggests that central banks should always aim at keeping information
about these shocks secret. In this paper, we derive the seemingly paradoxical
finding that central-bank transparency with regard to cost-push shocks may never-
theless be socially desirable. The difference between the abovementioned finding in
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and ours can be explained in the following way.
In both papers, central-bank transparency has the effect that the mere publication
of information about socially undesirable shocks may trigger socially undesirable
fluctuations in situations where firms would be unaware of the shocks otherwise.
An additional effect arises in the present paper. If the central bank does not publish
its private information, the firms will attempt to infer this information by observing
monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank has to take into account the
information that it signals by its policy. This may lead to signalling costs and, in
particular, to distorted responses to moderate shock realizations. These distortions
result from the fact that, upon observing moderate shocks, the central bank has
to make sure that firms do not expect it to react to large shocks.
On balance, we show that the aggregate consequences of both effects for welfare
depend on the probability of firms receiving independent information. First, if this
probability is low, opacity is socially desirable because it reduces the detrimental
economic effects caused by cost-push shocks. The central bank can achieve this by
pursuing a passive policy, thereby safeguarding the secrecy of its information.
Second, for a sufficiently high probability of firms’ receiving independent informa-
tion, the central bank would not remain inactive if it were opaque. As the central
bank will thus reveal its information anyway, transparency is socially desirable
because it removes the restraint imposed by the link between the central bank’s
actions and the firms’ expectations under opacity.
We also consider the possibility that, under a formal transparency requirement,
the central bank may have the discretionary power to withhold information. If
this was actually beneficial to the central bank, a transparency requirement
would be largely ineffective. The phenomenon that central banks can circumvent
transparency requirements is not just a theoretical possibility. When there were
attempts to force the Fed to publish the minutes of its committee’s meetings, the
Fed tried to abolish the minutes altogether (see Lewis, 1991). In our model, we
show that central banks that are required to be transparent with respect to
cost-push shocks will not withhold their information discretionarily if transparency
is socially desirable. Equivalently, whenever transparency is desirable ex ante, it will
also be desirable ex post after the central bank has observed the shock.
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While an important reason for the trend towards openness in monetary policy is
that central banks have given in to outside pressure (e.g., Buiter, 1999), our paper
identifies an additional mechanism that may have contributed to this trend.
With the constant progress of information technologies, the precision of private
agents’ direct information about economic shocks is likely to have been improving
over time. This development may have made transparency in monetary policy more
attractive. The assumption that the firms’ information has been improving is
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in D’Agostino and Whelan
(2008). This evidence suggests that the superiority of the Fed’s forecasts, which
was identified in Romer and Romer (2000), has vanished recently.3
Our paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the related
literature. We outline the model and conduct some first steps of our analysis in
Sections 3 and 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we derive the equilibria under transparency
and opacity, respectively. We compare welfare under both transparency regimes in
Section 7. The circumstances under which a transparency requirement is effective
are examined in Section 8. The robustness of our results is considered in Section 9.
Section 10 concludes. Some robustness issues and proofs are relegated to online
Appendices 4-9.
2. Related literature
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it is part of the
literature on signalling games, which goes back to Spence (1973). In monetary
economics, signalling games have been studied by Vickers (1986), Sibert (2002,
2003), Gersbach and Hahn (2007, 2009), and Sibert (2009). In our paper, the public
will attempt to infer the central bank’s private information about economic shocks
from monetary-policy action if the central bank keeps this information secret. This
is consistent with the empirical finding in Romer and Romer (2000) that
contractionary monetary policy leads to increases in inflation expectations. This
counter-intuitive result can be explained if we assume that contractionary
monetary policy signals private information of the central bank about shocks
that drive up future inflation.
In our paper, we consider not only separating equilibria like most papers on
signalling games in monetary policy, but study also pooling and semi-separating
equilibria. This enables us to identify the new effect that pooling and
semi-separating equilibria enable the central bank to ensure complete or partial
secrecy of its information.
Second, our paper complements the general literature on transparency in
monetary policy as surveyed by Geraats (2002), Hahn (2002), and Blinder et al.
(2008). This literature considers the economic effects of central-bank communica-
tion as well as the consequences that the publication of private central-bank
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3However, this effect could also be explained by increases in central-bank transparency.
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information has for welfare.4 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) show that central
banks may prefer some degree of ambiguity about monetary control in order to
be able to surprise private agents at a time when this is most valuable to them. This
framework has been modified to allow for normative analysis (Lewis, 1991) and for
an explicit distinction of control-error variance and the degree of transparency
(Faust and Svensson, 2001). Applying a New Keynesian specification of the
Phillips curve, Jensen studies the desirability of transparency with regard to the
central bank’s control error (Jensen, 2002) and private information about cost-push
shocks (Jensen, 2000). In contrast to Jensen (2000), firms’ price-setting in the
present paper is affected by firms’ expectations about the shock rather than the
actual shock realization.
Our paper is also related to Walsh (2007) and Baeriswyl and Cornand
(2007, 2010). These contributions study the dual role of the central bank’s
instrument as a stabilization tool and a public signal of the central bank’s
private information. The authors assume that the central bank commits to a
linear rule that minimizes unconditional losses and focus on the public’s
signal-extraction problem when the central bank’s instrument responds to two
different shocks. By contrast, we make the assumption that the central bank
chooses its policy on a discretionary basis, after observing its private information.
We concentrate on the non-linear distortion in the central bank’s response to a
single private signal under opacity.5 To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
also the first to examine the circumstances under which central banks may use
their discretionary power to withhold evidence even if they are operating under a
transparency regime.
3. Model
We consider a one-shot signalling game with a central bank (the sender) and a
multitude of firms (receivers). For the sake of brevity, we abstain from presenting
microeconomic foundations to our model, which can be found in Adam (2007),
for example.
In line with eq. (3) in Adam (2007), each firm’s optimal price, p*, is given by
p ¼ pþ y þ "0; ð1Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4In a much-cited paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show that transparency may be socially harmful if
agents find it individually optimal to coordinate their actions and if this coordination is not socially
desirable per se. However, Svensson (2006) convincingly argues that the range of parameters for which
this result holds is unlikely to be relevant in practice. Hellwig (2005) highlights that transparency may
lead to socially desirable coordination in price-setting.
5Because of our assumption of discretionary central-bank policy, we obtain results that are different
from those found in previous papers. For example, Baeriswyl and Cornand (2007) find that transparency
is detrimental with respect to markup shocks. The main point of our paper is that transparency may be
beneficial even in this case.
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where p is the aggregate price level, y is the (log) output gap,  a positive parameter,
and "0 represents a cost-push shock.6
On theoretical grounds, cost-push shocks can be justified by variations in
markups. Markup shocks can be modelled by a stochastic sales tax on all goods,
where revenues are used to finance lump-sum transfers to the agents.7 Markup
shocks can also be motivated by changes in the intensity of competition or in the
aggressiveness of wage bargainers.8 A general feature of markup shocks is that it is
individually optimal for firms to react to them. However, this response leads to
socially undesirable fluctuations that cannot be stabilized by the central bank
perfectly. In this sense, information about cost-push shocks is socially harmful in
the hands of price-setters. This is a special case of the more general insight provided
by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) in their Corollary 9 that private and public infor-
mation about sources of inefficient business-cycle fluctuation is welfare-reducing.
In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that only four realizations
of the shock are possible.9 The shock realizations are e0L, þe0L, e0H , þe0H with
0 < e0L < e
0
H (where L stands for low and H for high). The prior probabilities are
L for e0L and þe0L and H for e0H and þe0H (2H + 2L = 1). Thus the shock
distribution is symmetric. The restriction to a discrete set of possible shocks enables
us not only to derive analytical results for separating equilibria but also to study the
existence of pooling equilibria and semi-separating equilibria, where some types
of central bank pool, while others choose a policy that perfectly reveals their type.
By contrast, most analyses of signalling games in monetary economics are restricted
to separating equilibria (see, e.g., Sibert, 2009).
The central bank observes the shock with probability pCB (04 pCB4 1). With the
complementary probability, the central bank obtains no private information.
Consequently, there exist five types of central bank. Four types correspond to the
different possible shocks. The fifth type, denoted by 0, is a central bank that has not
observed the shock. The set of possible types is thus T 9 {H,L, 0, +L, +H}. Under
transparency, the central bank’s type is published. It is kept secret under opacity.
The central bank chooses its instrument m (log money growth), which affects
output via a quantity equation:
y ¼ m p: ð2Þ
The central bank’s loss function, which also represents social losses, is given by
L ¼ 1
1 þ a p
2 þ a
1 þ a y
2; ð3Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
6We normalize (log) natural output to zero and thus use the terms ‘output’ and ‘output gap’
interchangeably.
7For a discussion of markup shocks see Ball et al. (2005), among others. Compare also the extensive
discussion in Woodford (2002, pp.44-5).
8In Adam (2007), cost-push shocks are labelled real demand shocks.
9The distortions identified in this paper would also materialize for other shock distributions, as we will
explain in Section 9.
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where a5 0 is a parameter that measures the importance of the output target (this
loss function has been derived by Adam, 2007, in his Appendix A.2, for example;
see also Woodford, 2002).10
Adopting the notion of sticky information that has been introduced by
Mankiw and Reis (2002), we assume that only a fraction  (0<< 1) of firms
use up-to-date information. These firms, which we henceforth refer to as
‘attentive’, observe monetary-policy decisions and also the information that the
central bank publishes if it is operating under a transparency regime.11 In addition,
these firms jointly observe "0 with probability pF (04 pF4 1). The event of them
observing the shock is independent of whether the central bank observes the shock.
The remainder of firms are inattentive and do not obtain any information about
the shock or the central bank’s choice of monetary policy.
The sequence of events is as follows:
(i) Nature draws the shock "0.
(ii) The central bank becomes informed about "0 with probability pCB.
(iii) Under opacity, the central bank’s information is kept private. Under
transparency, it is published.
(iv) The central bank chooses its instrument m.
(v) A fraction  of firms, i.e. the attentive firms, obtain precise information on "0
with probability pF. With the complementary probability, these firms remain
ignorant of the shock. Moreover, the attentive firms observe m and any
information the central bank might have published. The remaining firms
do not update their information.
(vi) All firms choose the prices of their outputs.
We will derive perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria for two scenarios: a transparency
scenario in which the central bank publishes its observation of the shock if it has
observed the shock and an opacity scenario in which the central bank keeps this
information secret.
4. Preliminary steps
We begin our analysis with a few preliminary steps that enable us to present the
central bank’s losses in a convenient form. As inattentive firms’ expectations about
"0 are zero, the (log) prices they choose are also zero. As a result, the price level
is given by p= EF[p*], where EF is the expectations operator with respect to the
attentive firms’ information set. The equilibrium price level as a function of m can
now be obtained by inserting y=m p into (1) and applying EF:
p ¼  pþ ðm pÞ þ EF½"0ð Þ: ð4Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
10Compared to the more standard formulation L= p2 + ay2, we have normalized losses by the factor 11þa.
Obviously, this does not affect our findings; however, it will simplify the analysis.
11In Section 9, we discuss the assumption that the central bank’s instrument can be observed.
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Solving for p yields
p ¼ 
1  ð1  Þ mþ EF½"
0ð Þ: ð5Þ
It will be useful to introduce normalized values for the shock "9 [/
(1 (1 ))]"0 and its realizations e :¼ =ð1  ð1  ÞÞ½ e0 8t2T n{0}. With
the help of 9 ()/(1 (1 )), p can now be rewritten as
p ¼ mþ EF½": ð6Þ
It is crucial to note that EF["] is determined by the attentive firms’ direct
observation of the shock if they have in fact observed the shock. If they have not
observed the shock directly, EF["] depends on the central bank’s information under
transparency and on the central bank’s choice of m under opacity.
Inserting (2) and (6) into (3) yields
Lðm;EF½"Þ ¼ 1
1 þ a ðmþ EF½"Þ
2 þ a
1 þ a ðð1  Þm EF½"Þ
2: ð7Þ
Importantly, the central bank could always achieve zero losses by choosing m= 0 if
the attentive firms’ expectations concerning the cost-push shock were zero. By
contrast, the central bank can never achieve zero losses when firms’ expectations
are different from zero. Thus information about cost-push shocks is socially
harmful.
5. Transparency
In this section we focus on the transparency scenario. In the following, we derive
the optimal policy chosen by the different types of central bank. For types in T n{0},
we obtain EF["] = ". It is straightforward to check that (7) can be rewritten in the
following way:
Lðm;EF½"Þ ¼ að1 þ aÞð2 þ að1  Þ2Þ ðEF½"Þ
2 þ 
2 þ að1  Þ2






a ð1 þ aÞ
2 þ að1  Þ2 EF½": ð9Þ
Variable mTEF ½" can be interpreted as the optimal value of m, conditional on the fact
that the attentive firms’ expectations about " are given by EF["]. With slight abuse
of notation we will sometimes write mT for m
T
EF ½" evaluated at EF["] = et (t2T n
{0}). Then mT represents the optimal choice of type t2T n {0} under transparency.
For a (1 + a)> 0, mTEF ½" is a strictly monotonically increasing function of
EF["]. For a (1 + a)< 0, it is strictly monotonically decreasing. This observation
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is important, as we will draw an analogy under opacity and impose monotonicity as
a restriction on the equilibria. To simplify the exposition, we exclude the knife-edge
case a (1 + a) = 0 for the remainder of the paper.
It then remains to derive the optimal policy of an uninformed type t= 0. EF["]
may take five different values from this type’s perspective, namely eH, eL, 0, eL,
or eH, depending on whether the attentive firms receive information about the
shock and, if so, which realization they observe. Hence an uninformed central
bank chooses m to minimize expected losses
L0 :¼pF LLðm;eLÞ þ LLðm;þeLÞ þ HLðm;eHÞ þ HLðm;þeHÞ½ 
þ ð1  pFÞLðm; 0Þ:
Importantly, L(m, eL)+L(m, +eL), L(m, eH)+L(m, +eH), and L(m, 0) are
quadratic functions of m with minima at m= 0. As a consequence, the optimal
policy of an uninformed central bank under transparency is given by mT0 :¼ 0.
We summarize our observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under transparency, a unique equilibrium exists. Each type of
central bank t2T chooses mT .
In this equilibrium, the central bank chooses m so as to optimally trade off the
effect of the shock on output and prices. Because the central bank makes its private
information public, it does not have to care about its choice of m affecting the
firms’ estimate of the shock.
6. Opacity
Under opacity, the attentive firms do not receive the central bank’s information
directly. However, upon observing the central bank’s choice of money growth, they
may update their estimate of the central bank’s type. Under opacity, the model thus
corresponds to a signalling game.
With probability pF, attentive firms learn the correct realization of " because they
receive information independently of the central bank. With probability 1 pF they
obtain no independent information and attempt to infer the central bank’s
information from the central bank’s choice of money growth m. We introduce
f(m) with eH4 f(m)4 eH 8m to denote the attentive firms’ expectations about
", given that they have not observed the shock.
We focus on perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies that satisfy two
additional, plausible assumptions on f(m). In these perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria, the firms’ beliefs about the central bank’s type and thus f(m), in
particular, will be consistent with the central bank’s equilibrium strategy.
First, we impose a monotonicity requirement on f(m), as will be detailed in the
following. Imposing monotonicity is intuitive, given that under transparency the
central bank’s choice of m is a monotonic function of its estimate about the shock.
Under transparency, the equilibrium value of m is an increasing function of ECB["]
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for a (1 + a)> 0 and a decreasing function for a (1 + a)< 0. Hence we
assume that attentive firms’ expectations under opacity are a monotonic
function of m. In particular, we postulate that f(m) is weakly increasing for
a (1 + a)> 0 and weakly decreasing for a (1 + a)< 0.
Second, we assume that f(m) is an odd function, i.e. f(m) =f(m) 8m. This is
plausible because of the model’s linear-quadratic nature. Under transparency, for
example, the central bank’s optimal choice of m is also an odd function of the
central bank’s estimate about the shock.
These assumptions have several important implications. First, firms expect the
shock to be zero if they have not observed it and the central bank has chosen m= 0.
Formally, this can be stated as f(0) = 0. Second, and consequently, a central bank
of type 0 will choose m= 0, as can be verified easily. Third, the equilibrium
choices of all types t2T are a weakly monotonic function of the central bank’s





for a (1 + a)> 0 and mOH5mOL5mO0 ¼ 05mOþL5mOþH for a (1 + a)< 0,
where we use mO to denote type t’s equilibrium choice of m under opacity
(t2T ).12
In the following it will prove useful to introduce a critical value of pF, denoted by
pF , as follows
pF :¼
a
ð2 þ að1  Þ2Þð1 þ aÞ : ð10Þ
It is straightforward to derive
1  pF ¼
ða ð1 þ aÞÞ2
ð2 þ að1  Þ2Þð1 þ aÞ > 0:
Hence one can conclude 04pF < 1.
13
We are now in a position to describe the equilibria under opacity.
Proposition 2 For pF < p

F , a unique
14 equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, all
types of central bank t2T choose m= 0. If the attentive firms have not received
direct information about ", their expectations about the shock are f(0) = 0. For
a (1 + a)> 0, f(m) = eH 8m> 0 and f(m) =eH 8m< 0. For a (1 + a)< 0,
f(m) =eH 8m> 0 and f(m) = +eH 8m< 0.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12The third consequence of our assumptions can be explained as follows. Suppose, for example,
a (1 + a)> 0. Then f(m)5 0 8m> 0 because f(0) = 0 and f(m) is weakly monotonically increasing.
A central bank that has observed a positive shock would never choose a negative money growth rate
m< 0 because WmW would yield lower losses, which is readily verified with the help of (7). As a
consequence, H and L choose positive values of m. Analogously, H and L choose negative values
of m. Monotonicity of f(m) then requires mH5mL (otherwise the firms’ beliefs would be incorrect). In
a similar vein, mH4mL follows from the monotonicity of f(m).
13Recall that we have excluded the knife-edge case a (1 + a) = 0.
14To be more precise, the equilibrium is unique in the sense that no additional equilibrium exists in
which the equilibrium choices for the five central bank types T are different. However, additional
equilibrium with different out-of-equilibrium beliefs exist.
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The proof is given in Appendix 1 (existence) and Appendix 5 (uniqueness).
Intuitively, if the chances of the firms receiving information directly are rather
low, it is profitable for the central bank to remain completely passive. As the firms
are unlikely to learn about the shock, the expected losses incurred by not stabilizing
the shock are low. Importantly, by not responding to its own private information,
the central bank can prevent the firms from inferring this information.
For pF > p

F , no unique equilibrium exists in general. In the following, we will
demonstrate that an equilibrium satisfying our additional assumptions always exists
by characterizing equilibria for different intervals of pF. With the help of
p^F :¼ eH þ eL
eH þ ð2pF  1ÞeL
pF; ð11Þ
it is possible to describe the circumstances under which the same outcome as under
transparency can prevail under opacity:
Proposition 3 If and only if pF5p^F , there is an equilibrium under opacity in which
all types of central bank t2T choose the money growth rates they would find
optimal under transparency (mT ).
For the proof, see Appendix 2. Intuitively, for high values of pF the attentive firms
are likely to be informed about the shock directly. As a consequence, it is optimal
for the central bank to behave in the same manner as under transparency.
We note that p^F < 1. Hence, the range of values of pF for which the fully
separating equilibria described in Proposition 3 exist is always non-empty.
Additionally, we note that p^F > p

F . Consequently, we have to show that perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria satisfying our additional assumptions on f(m) exist for the
interval pF < pF < p^F . Intuitively, separating equilibria with the same choices as
under transparency do not exist, as there would be strong incentives for a central
bank of type H to mimic L. By mimicking the L-type, type H can reduce the firms’
expectations about the shock, which leads to lower losses if the firms do not receive
information independently. However, if H could successfully mimic L, this
would be costly to L as the firms might mistake it for H. This, in turn, would
lead to high losses due to the firms’ beliefs that the shock is very large. Thus type L
tends to choose an m farther away from mTH in order to make mimicking more
costly for H.
One example of such behaviour is given in the following proposition, proved in
Appendix 6:
Proposition 4 There is a critical value for pF, denoted by epF , with pF <epF < 1
such that the following semi-separating equilibrium exists under opacity for
pF 2 ½pF;epF. A central bank of type t2 {L, 0, +L} chooses m= 0. A central
bank of type t2 {H, +H} chooses mT . If attentive firms have not received
direct information about ", their expectations about the shock are f(0) = 0. For
a (1 + a)> 0, f(m) = eH 8m> 0 and f(m) =eH 8m< 0. For a (1 + a)< 0,
f(m) =eH 8m> 0 and f(m) = +eH 8m< 0.
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We have shown that, for sufficiently large values of pF (pF5p^F), separating
equilibria exist where all central-bank types display the same behaviour under
opacity as under transparency. Moreover, for sufficiently small values of
pF (pF4pF), pooling equilibria exist. For somewhat larger pF (p

F4pF4epF),
semi-separating equilibria occur in which central banks of types L and L mimic
the behaviour of zero. We note that epF < p^F cannot be ruled out, as can be readily
verified. Thus it remains to describe possible equilibria for the interval pF 2epF; p^F½.
This gap is filled by the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix 7:
Proposition 5 Suppose epF < p^F . For all pF 2epF; p^F½, values  and  with
0 <  <  < 1 exist such that for all  2 ½; separating equilibria exist under
opacity that satisfy the following properties: Central banks of types H and +H
choose mTH and m
T
H , respectively. Central banks of types L and +L choose mTL
and mTL , respectively. Type 0 chooses m
T
0 ¼ 0.
These equilibria are particularly interesting as they represent fully separating
equilibria where the behaviour of types L and L is distorted by the factor 
over and against the equilibria under transparency. This distortion is the result
of the incentives of types H and H to mimic the behaviour of the types with
moderate shock realizations, i.e., L and L. As successful imitation may increase
the firms’ shock estimate, types L and L choose the distorted money growth rates
mTL and m
T
L respectively, which makes mimicking less attractive for H and H.
To sum up, we have demonstrated that a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
satisfying our additional assumptions on f(m) always exists. In each of these
equilibria, the firms’ beliefs f(m) are consistent with the central bank’s equilibrium
strategy.
7. Comparison
In this section, we compare the central bank’s losses and thus also social losses
under transparency with the losses under opacity. The following proposition,
proved in Appendix 3, contains the major finding of this paper:
Proposition 6 For pF < p

F , transparency is strictly inferior to opacity. For
pF < pF < p^F , transparency is strictly superior. For pF5p^F , transparency is
weakly superior.15
We stress that Proposition 6 does not only hold with regard to the equilibria
characterized in the previous section. It holds for all perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria satisfying our additional assumptions about f(m).
Proposition 6 has the implication that whether transparency is desirable depends
on the quality of the firms’ direct information. If attentive firms are unlikely to be
..........................................................................................................................................................................
15For pF5p^F , transparency and opacity lead to equivalent results with respect to welfare if the equilibria
specified in Proposition 3 materialize. Transparency is strictly superior for all other equilibria.
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well-informed, transparency is detrimental. If there is a high probability of their
being well-informed, central-bank transparency is desirable.
The intuition for this finding is as follows. If the central bank publishes its private
information, it provides the attentive firms with information that may be unknown
to them. As it is individually optimal for firms, albeit socially harmful, to respond
to the shock, publishing information is costly to society. On the other hand,
transparency eliminates the signalling costs the central bank incurs if the money
growth rate it would like to choose under transparency were to signal the wrong
information under opacity.
For low-quality information available to firms (and corresponding low levels of
pF), the costs incurred by transparency outweigh the benefits. Loosely speaking, it is
better to remain inactive in this case and to speculate that firms will not discover
the shock realization. By contrast, if the firms’ information is high in quality, the
firms will be probably informed anyway. By publishing its private information the
central bank can avoid the signalling costs.
8. Feasibility of transparency
In this section, we focus on the question whether transparency is feasible. Even if
the central bank is required to be transparent, it is plausible that it can always
withhold evidence. If this was actually profitable to the central bank for some shock
realizations, a transparency requirement would be ineffective even in the case where
it would be socially desirable.
In order to examine the feasibility of transparency, we extend the transparency
scenario in the following way. Whenever the central bank observes the shock, it can
choose between publishing this information and asserting that it does not know
about a shock. However, it cannot forge information by claiming that it has
observed a shock that it has not observed. Moreover, a central bank that does
not observe a shock cannot prove that it does not possess information and thus
cannot certify its type.16 We will call transparency feasible if a perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this game of partially certifiable information exists in which the
central bank never withholds its private information.
Such an equilibrium of the game where the central bank can decide on
transparency after observing the shock will be a separating equilibrium (if it
exists) because the attentive firms can exactly identify the central bank’s type.
This is reminiscent of the equilibria of the game under opacity that are described
in Propositions 3 and 5, which also represent separating equilibria. However, in the
latter cases the attentive firms learn the central bank’s type from observing
monetary policy rather than from the information that the central bank
decides to publish after observing it, which is the case studied in this section.
In Appendix 8, we show
..........................................................................................................................................................................
16For an overview of games with certifiable information see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch.5). Games
of partially certifiable information are studied by Shin (1994), among others.
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Proposition 7 Transparency is feasible if pF5pF .
A comparison with Proposition 6 reveals that transparency is feasible exactly in
those circumstances in which it is socially desirable. Thus the possibility of the
central bank withholding private information does not limit the usefulness of
transparency from a social perspective.
Why does the social desirability of transparency entail that it is feasible?
Committing the central bank to transparency is socially beneficial when opacity
would involve signalling costs. In this case, the central bank also benefits from
avoiding these signalling costs by releasing its private information discretionarily.
For example, a central bank having observed L prefers to prove its type, thus
preventing the attentive firms from mistaking it for a central bank of type H.
9. Discussion
Here we discuss some issues related to the robustness of our findings. In particular,
we focus on the specification of shocks, different types of shocks, the number of
instruments and shocks, the additional restrictions on equilibrium we have
introduced under opacity, the observability of the instrument, the structure of
firms’ information, imprecise signals, and the possibility of reputation-building
in an infinitely repeated version of our game.
9.1 Specification of shocks
In this paper we have focused on four different shock realizations. This number is
sufficiently high to identify the important signalling incentives in our framework
and at the same time low enough to permit analytical results. If we considered only
one possible realization of a positive and a negative shock (as opposed to the two in
our model), we would ignore the crucial incentive of type H to mimic type L, which
leads to the distortions under opacity driving our results regarding welfare. By
contrast, if we considered more possible realizations of positive and negative
shocks, the signalling incentives and thus the distortions would remain, but the
analysis would be substantially more complex. In particular, with a continuum of
potential shock realizations it is possible to show that pooling equilibria exist under
opacity for small values of pF and fully separating equilibria occur for large values of
pF, which is in line with the analysis in this paper.
17
9.2 Other types of shocks
In our paper we deliberately focus on cost-push shocks because we intend to
demonstrate that even with these shocks transparency can be socially desirable.
We could examine demand shocks instead, but transparency regarding these
shocks would never be socially harmful. Under opacity, separating equilibria
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17A detailed analysis is available upon request.
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exist that would perfectly reveal the central bank’s information. Then transparency
and opacity would be equivalent with respect to welfare. Moreover, additional
equilibria may exist under opacity, which would definitely entail lower welfare
levels (for a detailed analysis, see Hahn, 2009). Consequently, transparency
would be desirable from a welfare point of view.
9.3 Two shocks at the same time
As a next step, consider our basic model and assume that there are demand shocks
in addition to cost-push shocks. Accordingly, aggregate demand is y=m p+ for
some arbitrarily distributed demand shock . For simplicity of exposition, we make
the assumption that the central bank observes the demand shock with certainty but
the firms receive no information about its size.
Then our analysis can be used to address the question whether the central bank
should publish information on cost-push shocks, given that it is already transparent
about demand shocks. This can be seen by defining ~m :¼ mþ , which can be
interpreted as the difference between the instrument actually chosen by the central
bank (m) and the choice of instrument () that would be necessary to stabilize
only the demand shock. Importantly, all propositions would continue to hold if we
substituted ~m for m. For example, if the probability of firms observing cost-push
shocks was low (pF < p

F), an equilibrium would exist in which ~m ¼ 0 would be
chosen by the central bank, irrespective of its information about the cost-push
shock. Intuitively, the central bank would perfectly stabilize demand shocks
( ~m ¼ 0 entails m=) but would be passive with respect to cost-push shocks.18
9.4 Restrictions on equilibrium
In Section 6, where we analyse the opacity scenario, we have introduced two
important restrictions on the equilibria under opacity, namely that f(m) is
monotonic and odd. Relaxing these assumptions might allow for additional
equilibria. Although a complete characterization of all additional equilibrium
candidates is beyond the scope of this paper, it is plausible that these equilibria
would lead to higher losses under opacity. For example, an equilibrium where type
L chooses negative values of m under opacity despite mTL > 0 is likely to be less
desirable than equilibria satisfying our restrictions. Hence relaxing the restrictions
on equilibria might make transparency more attractive over and against opacity.
9.5 Observability of instrument
As has been explained before, the fact that the central bank cannot separate shock
stabilization from signalling information when adjusting its instrument under
opacity is crucial for our findings. This link relies on the assumption that the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
18The observation that the central bank can perfectly stabilize demand shocks lends plausibility to our
previous assumption that it chooses to be transparent with respect to these shocks.
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attentive firms can observe the central bank’s instrument. It is therefore warranted
to discuss the plausibility of this assumption in more detail.
In practice, central banks’ ability to keep their instruments secret is limited. The
Federal Reserve did not publish its policy directive before 1994. However, target
changes could be inferred from movements in the federal funds rate rather quickly.
Cook and Hahn (1989, p.332) relate that, from 1974 to 1979, the Fed’s control of
the federal funds rate was so firm that the public could detect most target changes
on the day they occurred. The financial press reported these changes on the
following day. Interestingly, the signalling effect of monetary policy actions was
identified by Romer and Romer (2000) for a period during which the policy
directive was not published immediately. To sum up, if the central bank cannot
ensure full secrecy of its instrument, the only possible approach to severing the link
between shock stabilization and signalling information is transparency about
shocks, which is examined in this paper.
9.6 Structure of firms’ information
It is instructive to discuss our assumptions on the firms’ possible information sets.
In our model, there are two different channels of information that firms may utilize
under opacity, namely the central bank’s decisions and own research about the size
of aggregate shocks. While information about monetary policy can be easily
obtained from the financial press, forming an own estimate of aggregate shocks
is arguably more difficult. It thus seems natural to assume that all firms that observe
own information about shocks also use readily available information on monetary
policy.
How would our results change if we modified this assumption? The distortions
under opacity arise from the incentives of types H and H to signal moderate
shock realizations and thus to mimic the behaviour of types L and L. These
incentives depend on the possibility that firms’ estimates of the shock may be
influenced by their observations of the instrument. This possibility arises as long
as there is a positive probability of some firms observing the instrument but not
independent information about the shock. Allowing for the additional possibility of
some other firms observing own information but not the central bank’s decisions
would not eliminate the incentives to signal information, which are crucial for our
results regarding welfare.
9.7 Modelling imprecise information
In our paper, imperfect information about the shock is modelled by the assumption
that the central bank and the firms observe the shock only with a positive
probability. An alternative approach to modelling imperfect information about
shocks is to assume that a signal is observed with certainty but that this signal is
imprecise (see the literature on central-bank transparency surveyed in Section 2).
Our assumption has been made for analytical convenience, as it facilitates the
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computation of expectations about the shock and the expectations about other
agents’ observations. For example, an attentive firm that observes information
about the shock does not have to infer the central bank’s information from the
instrument under opacity because the central bank’s signal contains no information
over and against the firm’s own information.
Our results could be directly extended to the case where the central bank’s and
attentive firms’ signals are noisy, provided that the noise terms were perfectly
correlated. Introducing imperfect correlation between the central bank’s signal
and the signal observed by firms would severely complicate the analysis but
would plausibly lead to even higher signalling costs under opacity. In this case,
also the firms with an own signal would try to infer the central bank’s signal from
its policy, as the central bank’s signal would contain additional information about
the shock. Hence imperfectly correlated signals would tighten the link between
shock stabilization and information signalling that, as we have argued before, is
crucial for our result that transparency may be beneficial.19
9.8 Repetition of the game
If we repeated our game infinitely many times, the equilibria of the one-shot game
could also be used to characterize all Markov-perfect equilibria of this new game. In
these equilibria, the central bank’s strategy prescribes an optimal choice in each
period, given the central bank’s information and the behaviour of firms. Hence
monetary policy is credible in the sense that firms know that the central bank will
never deviate from its strategy. All of our results about the relative merits of
transparency and opacity would continue to hold in this case. Under opacity,
there would be additional equilibria in which firms play strategies that are not
Markov perfect. In some of these equilibria, reputation-building may alleviate
the distortions arising under opacity for pF > p

F . Plausibly, this might be
achieved for sufficiently high discount factors if firms could coordinate on a
trigger strategy. This trigger strategy would punish an opaque central bank in the
future if it was detected to choose its instrument in a way that would not be optimal
under transparency. However, it is not clear that such an equilibrium would be
played and so the same outcome as under transparency could be attained under
opacity.20
..........................................................................................................................................................................
19Interestingly, the quality of the central bank’s information, which is associated with parameter pCB in
our model, is irrelevant for the relative performance of transparency and opacity. Consequently, our
findings extend to the case where the central bank is always informed about cost-push shocks.
20Moreover, equilibria in which the distortions under opacity are eliminated by reputation-building
would not exist if the shocks were drawn from a distribution with an unbounded support.
Intuitively, there would always be a positive probability of a shock realization that would be so large
such that the central bank would prefer the short-term gains from deviating from the policy that would
be optimal under transparency over the long-term costs incurred by losing reputation. For a related
argument, see footnote 6 in Loisel (2008), who analyses reputation-building in a New Keynesian
framework.
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10. Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed the question whether central banks should publish
information on sources of socially inefficient business-cycle fluctuations. Although,
at first sight, it seems that central banks should withhold evidence on these
disturbances, we have shown that transparency may be socially desirable even in
this case. If the probability of firms receiving information independently is
sufficiently high, transparency eliminates the signalling incentives of different
types of central bank and hence, in turn, the policy distortions prevalent under
opacity. Our analysis has also highlighted that transparency is always feasible if
it is socially desirable, as withholding information on a discretionary basis is not
beneficial to the central bank in this case.
Our model can also be used to rationalize the current trend towards transparency
in monetary policy to some extent. As improvements in information technologies
plausibly raise the probability of economic agents receiving information on the
economy independently of the central bank, it may be increasingly important for
central banks to become more open about their assessment of the economy.
We certainly do not want to argue that the mechanism identified in this paper is
the only explanation for the increased transparency of central banks, but it may
have contributed to this ongoing development. At any rate, our analysis suggests
that the increased openness of monetary-policy makers is in fact a welcome
development.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (Appendices 4-9) is available at the OUP website.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2: existence
In this Appendix, we establish existence. Uniqueness is considered in online
Appendix 5. To show that the proposed equilibrium exists, we have to demonstrate
that there is no profitable deviation for all types t2T . Before we show this, we note
that central-bank losses can be written in a compact manner with the help of pF
(see (10)). Suppose that the central bank chooses mTe , which is the choice that
would be optimal under transparency if the attentive firms believed the shock to be
e. Using (8) and (9), we obtain the following expression for the central bank’s losses
in this case:
LðmTe ; EF½"Þ ¼ pFðEF½"Þ2 þ ð1  pFÞðe EF½"Þ2: ð12Þ
Deviations for 0 There is no profitable deviation for 0, as m= 0 is its preferred
choice under transparency as well and any other choice would imply that the public
believes a large shock has occurred, which would increase losses further. It thus
remains to examine whether profitable deviations exist for the other types. For
simplicity, we focus on the case a (1 + a)> 0. In this case, f(m) = eH 8m> 0
and f(m) =eH 8m< 0 hold. The case with a (1 + a)< 0 is completely
analogous and is therefore omitted.
Deviations for H and H Now we focus on possible deviations for H. In
equilibrium, type H’s losses are
pFLð0;EF½" ¼ eHÞ þ ð1  pFÞLð0;EF½" ¼ 0Þ ¼ pFe2H; ð13Þ
where we have utilized (12). It is straightforward to see that for a (1 + a)> 0 any
deviation to a negative value of m cannot be optimal because a positive value of m
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of the same size would be superior in this case. Thus we consider only deviations
with m> 0 in the following. A deviation m> 0 always results in expectations
EF["] = eH. Consequently, the most profitable of these deviations is m
T
H . In line
with (12), losses for this deviation are
L mTH; EF½" ¼ eH
  ¼ pFe2H : ð14Þ




H (compare (13) and (14)) or,
equivalently, pF4pF . Due to the symmetry of the firms’ optimization problem, this
also implies that no profitable deviation exists for H in this case.
Deviations for L and L We show next that no profitable deviation exists for L.
Again it suffices to examine positive deviations, as any negative deviation would be
dominated by a positive deviation of the same size for a (1 + a)> 0. Type L’s
equilibrium losses are pFLð0; eLÞ þ ð1  pFÞLð0; 0Þ ¼ pFe2L, while a deviation m
with m> 0 entails losses pFL(m, eL) + (1 pF)L(m, eH). The most profitable of
all deviations is mTE with E9 pFeL + (1 pF)eH.21
This deviation will not be attractive if the equilibrium losses are smaller than the
losses incurred by choosing mTE
pFe
2
L < pFLðmTE ; eLÞ þ ð1  pFÞLðmTE ; eHÞ;
which, utilizing (12), can be expressed as
pFe
2




L þ ð1  pFÞðE  eLÞ2
 þ ð1  pFÞ pFe2H þ ð1  pFÞðE  eHÞ2 :






L þ ð1  pFÞpFe2H for pF4pF .
Hence there is no profitable deviation for L. Showing that no profitable
deviation exists for L is completely analogous.
To sum up, no type t2T has a profitable deviation, and the equilibrium
outlined in the proposition exists. h
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
As a first step, we specify beliefs and, in particular, out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
We have to distinguish between a (1 + a)> 0 and a (1 + a)< 0. For
a (1 + a)> 0 beliefs are
f ðmÞ ¼
eH for m < mTL
eL for mTL4m < 0
0 for m ¼ 0
þeL for 0 < m4mTL





21This fact can be easily checked by solving the respective first-order condition for m.
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and for a (1 + a)< 0 they are
f ðmÞ ¼






0 for m ¼ 0
eL for 0 < m4mTL
eH for m > mTL.
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
For the remainder of the proof we assume a (1 + a)> 0. Adapting the proof to
a (1 + a)< 0 is straightforward. In the following, we have to prove that no
profitable deviation exists for all types t2T .
Deviations for 0 It is easy to show that 0 cannot profitably deviate from m= 0.
Even if f(m) = 0 8m held, m= 0 would be preferable over and against all m 6¼ 0. For
all m with f(m) 6¼ 0, type 0’s losses would be even higher than in the case where
f(m) = 0 would hold. Thus 0 represents the optimal choice of m, given the beliefs
defined in (15).
Deviations for H and H It suffices to consider possible deviations of H, as the
analysis of type H’s deviations is completely analogous. We note that a deviation
to a negative value of m always leads to higher losses than a deviation to the
respective positive value of the same size. Therefore we focus on deviations
with m> 0.
According to (15), all deviations m with m > mTL entail f(m) = eH. As m
T
H is H’s
optimal choice, conditional on f(m) = eH, these deviations are not profitable. A
deviation to 0 implies f(0) = 0. We note that p^F > p

F . Thus pF > p^F implies
pF > p

F . According to the proof of Proposition 2, type H therefore prefers m
T
H
with f ðmTHÞ ¼ eH to 0 with f ðmTHÞ ¼ 0. Hence m= 0 never represents a profitable
deviation.
Finally, we have to check whether deviating to a value of m with 0 < m4mTL
might yield lower losses to H. For such a deviation, f(m) = eL according to (15). The
most profitable of these deviations is mTL .
22 Thus we need to compare type H’s
losses for mTH with its losses for m
T
L . If a central bank of type H chooses m
T
H , losses
can be computed with the help of (12):
LðmTH; eHÞ ¼ pFe2H :
By contrast, if H chooses mTL , losses will amount to
LH;3 :¼ pFLðmTL ; eHÞ þ ð1  pFÞLðmTL ; eLÞ
¼ pFðpFe2H þ ð1  pFÞe2LÞ þ pFð1  pFÞðeH  eLÞ2:
ð16Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
22Conditional on f(m) = eL, m ¼ pFmTH þ ð1  pFÞmTL would minimize losses. Because this value of m is
strictly larger than mTL , argminm20;mTL fpFLðm; eHÞ þ ð1  pFÞLðm; eLÞg ¼ mTL .
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As a consequence, there is no profitable deviation if LH;35LðmTH; eHÞ or
pFðpFe2H þ ð1  pFÞe2LÞ þ pFð1  pFÞðeH  eLÞ25pFe2H :
This inequality can be reformulated as
pF p











pFðe2H  e2LÞ þ ð1  pFÞðeH  eLÞ2
¼ eH þ eL
eH þ ð2pF  1ÞeL
pF ¼ p^F:
Hence, if and only if pF5p^F , there is no profitable deviation for H.
Deviations for L and L Again we focus on deviations of L with m5 0.
According to the proof of Proposition 2, deviating to m= 0 is not profitable if
pF > p

F , which holds because of pF > p^F and p^F > p

F . Choosing a value of m from
the interval 0;mTL ½ is never profitable, as this would entail f(m) = eL and mTL is the
value of m that minimizes type L’s losses contingent on f(m) = eL. It remains to be
shown that L cannot lower its losses by choosing some m > mTL . Such a choice
implies f(m) = eH. The deviation with m > m
T
L that yields the lowest losses can be
easily computed as mTE with E = pFeL + (1 pF)eH. Following (12), this deviation
implies losses
LL;3 :¼ pFLðmTE ; eLÞ þ ð1  pFÞLðmTE ; eHÞ
¼ pF pFe2L þ ð1  pFÞðeL  EÞ2
 þ ð1  pFÞ pFe2H þ ð1  pFÞðeH  EÞ2 
¼ pF pFe2L þ ð1  pFÞð1  pFÞ2ðeH  eLÞ2
 
þ ð1  pFÞ pFe2H þ ð1  pFÞp2FðeH  eLÞ2
 
¼ pFðpFe2L þ ð1  pFÞe2HÞ þ pFð1  pFÞð1  pFÞðeH  eLÞ2:
ð17Þ
In equilibrium, L’s losses are
LðmTL ; eLÞ ¼ pFe2L:
Thus from L’s perspective deviating is not desirable if LL;35LðmTL ; eLÞ, which
is equivalent to
pFð1  pFÞðe2H  e2LÞ þ pFð1  pFÞð1  pFÞðeH  eLÞ2 > 0:
As this inequality always holds, all deviations lead to higher losses for L over and
against the equilibrium losses. Consequently, we have demonstrated that the
proposed equilibrium exists for pF5p^F . For pF < p^F , the equilibrium does not
exist because H and H can profitably deviate to mTL in this case. h
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 6
3.1 Case pF < p

F
For pF < p

F , the statement of the proposition is a direct consequence of the proof
of Proposition 2. There we have shown that each type of bank t2T n{0} prefers 0
with f(0) = 0 to mT with f ðmT Þ, provided that pF < pF . Thus each of these central-
bank types has lower losses under opacity than under transparency. Moreover, type
0’s losses are unaffected by the transparency regime. Consequently, expected social
losses are lower under opacity for pF < p

F .
3.2 Case pF > p

F
The case with pF > p

F is more intricate, because the equilibria under opacity are
not unique in general. We proceed by showing that every potential equilibrium
under opacity yields higher losses compared to the transparency solution (the only
exception being the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 3, which is equivalent with
respect to losses). While it is unclear for which parameter constellations these
potential equilibria exist (if they exist at all), we prove that, if they existed, they
would definitely lead to higher social losses over and against the equilibrium under
transparency. Checking all potential equilibria is straightforward but tedious. These
steps are therefore relegated to online Appendix 9. h
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